Arguments for either metaphysical determinism or libertarianism each face problems with their tenability. If determinism holds then free will is illusory (and a grand illusion at that!) and a conceit of human experience. Not to say that an argumentum ad consequentiam should used as a proof against a theory. Likewise, if free will taken as a matter of fact, then evidence – from physics, cognitive explorations, psychology and our deepest introspection that confront our assumptions – must be ignored.
I argue that determinism suffers from reductionism, mistakenly conflates influence and determination, and fails to incorporate potentiality and transcending characteristics of the individual’s mind; that libertarianism fails by believing that humans are a special case -floating freely and contextually unaffected – and by ignoring that there are varying degress of expressing one’s will that authentically exercise the power of the will and incorporate determinism, both; and, finally, that compatibilism accurately reflects human experience. This notion will be clearer if compatibilism is thought of as a dialectical process in which determinism and free will stand in opposition to one another and emerging from this conflict is a potrayal of actual experience. A result of this critque will be to discard the erroneous portion of each and preserve the useful portion of the two ideas (aufhebung/upheavel); that is to say, compatibilism.